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NOVEL SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AFTER REESE V.
STROH: THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT'S LOVE
AFFAIR WITH FRYE
Robert D. Leinbach
Abstract. In Reese v. Stroh, the Washington Supreme Court upheld the use of the Frye test
as a threshold inquiry in civil cases involving novel scientific evidence. By affirming the
decision of the court of appeals, but not its reasoning, the Washington Supreme Court side-
stepped the court of appeals's argument for adoption of the Daubert standard in civil cases
analyzing ER 702. This Note examines the decision in Reese v. Stroh and concludes that the
Washington Supreme Court failed to determine clearly the proper analysis of ER 702 in cases
involving novel scientific evidence. It further agrees with Justice Johnson's concurring
opinion that the Daubert test provides the appropriate analysis of ER 702 under such
circumstances. It recommends that Washington adopt the Daubert standard in all cases
involving novel scientific evidence to address best the needs of an increasingly technological
society.
In Reese v. Stroh,' the Washington Supreme Court had the opportunity
to clarify the proper application of Washington Rule of Evidence (ER)
7022 in cases involving novel scientific evidence. The court instead
avoided the issue and decided the case on other grounds, holding that the
scientific methodology applied in Reese was not novel.3 In the process,
the court expressly retained the rule, first articulated in 1923 in Frye v.
United States,4 that expert testimony derived from a scientific theory or
principle is admissible only if it has achieved general acceptance in the
relevant scientific community.5 The court, however, did not articulate
how expert testimony should be analyzed for reliability under ER 702.
Because the Frye test no longer is sufficient for such an analysis, it
should be abandoned and replaced by the test enunciated by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.6
In Daubert, the Court stated that the rule established in Frye is
"incompatible with" the "liberal thrust" of the Federal Rules of Evidence
1. 128 Wash. 2d 300, 907 P.2d 282 (1995) [hereinafter Reese III].
2. ER 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise." Wash. R. Evid. 702.
3. Reese 111, 128 Wash. 2d at 307, 907 P.2d at 286.
4. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
5. Reese 111, 128 Wash. 2d at 306, 907 P.2d at 285.
6. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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(FRE) and their "general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to
'opinion' testimony.",7 On December 19, 1978, the Washington Supreme
Court adopted a new evidence code based on the Fec eral Rules of
Evidence, and the Washington Rules of Evidence became effective on
April 2, 1979.8 ER 702 and ER 7039 mirror FIE 702 and FRE 703.IO
Prior to the adoption of the Washington Rules of Evidence, Washington
courts applied the Frye test waen confronted with questions of
admissibility of novel scientific evidence. In the years between the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Daubert decision,
many courts and commentators debated whether Frye had continuing
validity.' The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that debate for the federal
court system in Daubert. Yet the Supreme Court of Washington in State
v. Cauthron, although acknowledging the recent trend towards rejecting
the Frye standard, upheld the state's long-standing adherence to Frye in
criminal cases. 3
Seizing upon the opportunity to distinguish Cauthron, Division One
of the Washington Court of Appeals held in Reese v. Stroh 4 that Frye
only applied in a criminal context, and that Daubert was tae appropriate
standard in a civil context. As Reese II was appealed to the Washington
7. Id. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988) (citing Fed. R.
Evid. 701-05)).
8. See Robert H. Aronson, The Law of Evidence in Washington at v (2d ed. 1953).
9. ER 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may
be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
Wash. R. Evid 703.
10. See Wash. R. Evid. 702, 703 cmts.
11. Some authorities viewed the failure of FRE 702 to mention Frye or its "generally accepted in
the relevant scientific community" language as an indication that the drafters intended to abandon
the Frye standard. See Aronson, supra note 8, § 702, at 11 (1993). Other authorities view the
adoption of FRE 702 without any mention of Frye as an indication that Frye is still good law,
finding it implausible that over 60 years ofjurisprudence would be overruled without comment. See,
e.g., Stephen A. Salzburg & Kenneth R. Redder, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 452 (3d ed.
1982).
12. 120 Wash. 2d 879, 846 P.2d 502 (1993).
13. In Cauthron, the Washington Supreme Court held that evidence of the restricted fragment
length polymorphism (RFLP) method of DNA typing was accepted universally aid thus admissible.
120 Wash. 2d at 899, 846 P.2d at 512. The court reversed Cauthron's conviction on seven counts of
first degree rape, however, because testimony that Cauthron's DNA "matched" the perpetrator was
improperly admitted without statistical support of its probability. Id. at 907, 846 P 2d at 516.
14. 74 Wash. App. 550, 874 P.2d 200 (1994), aff'd, 128 Wash. 2d 300, 907 P.2d 282 (1995)
[hereinafter Reese II].
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Supreme Court, lawyers anxiously awaited the court's clarification of the
matter. Unfortunately, the majority's opinion in Reese HI failed to clarify
the law on the admissibility of novel scientific evidence.
This Note analyzes the decision in Reese III and reveals the need for a
clear, concise standard for Washington courts when applying ER 702 and
ER 703 to questions involving scientific expert testimony. Part I of this
Note provides a brief history of the Frye and Daubert decisions and
reviews Washington's application of Frye prior to Reese v. Stroh. Part II
traces the procedural history of Reese v. Stroh. Part III critically analyzes
the holding of the Washington Supreme Court. Finally, part IV
concludes that the supreme court's continued adherence to the Frye
analysis is outdated, ill-advised, and unnecessary in both civil and
criminal cases. It suggests that the Washington Supreme Court should
adopt the analysis set forth in Daubert in all cases involving scientific
expert testimony to provide consistency and responsiveness to the needs
of a more scientific and technological society, as envisioned by the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
I. STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING NOVEL SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE
A. Frye's General Acceptance Test
The problem of ensuring reliable expert testimony began well before
the Frye decision. In the 1858 case of Winans v. New York & Erie
Railroad,15 the U.S. Supreme Court observed that "[e]xperience has
shown that opposite opinions of persons professing to be experts may be
obtained to any amount... wasting the time and wearying the patience
of both court and jury, and perplexing, instead of elucidating, the
questions involved .... ."6 The Frye court attempted to correct some of
this judicial inefficiency by establishing a bright line test wherein expert
testimony should not be admitted unless the scientific principle from
which the deduction has been made is "sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."' 7
Frye dealt with the issue of the admissibility of the results of a systolic
blood pressure deception test." The District of Columbia Court of
15. 62 U.S. 88 (1858).
16. Id. at 101.
17. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
18. The systolic blood pressure deception test was an early version of the "lie detector" test.
1129
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Appeals held that this deception test was inadmissible because the test
had not yet "gained such standing and scientific recognition among
physiological and psychological authorities as would justijy the courts in
admitting" the expert testimony as to its results. 9 The Frye decision was
lauded as keeping pace with the state of technology in 1923, while
granting the courts the instruments necessary to counter the battle of the
so-called experts of suspect science.
1. Pros and Cons ofFrye
The most impressive aspect of Frye has been its staying power. The
principal reason behind its over seventy years of applicability is its
straightforwardness. This clarity reduces the need for time-consuming
analysis of the reliability of every scientific methodology by the
presiding judge. Frye also has been praised for protecting against the
prejudicial effect of unproved hypotheses and avoiding conducting the
misleading and confusing reliability determination in frcnt of a jury.20
Under Frye, the reliability determination is made extrajudicially by the
relevant scientific community." Supporters of Frye argue that such a
determination should be made by those most qualified--the scientists
themselves." Such an approach alleviates the concern underlying Frye
that juries are likely to give too much weight to the probative value of
the testimony of purported scientific experts.
The Frye standard also has had its share of critics. The standard has
been termed "vague" because determining the relevant scientific
community can be elusive and arbitrary.' It is further difficult to
determine what percentage of the community constitutes general
acceptance.' 4 As some commentators have observed, Frye "simply does
not acknowledge that 'consensus' is multi-faceted and reflects different
meanings in different scientific contexts."" Also, even before Daubert,
19. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
20. Michael H. Graham, Handbook ofFederal Evidence § 703.2 (3d ed. 1991).
21. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
22. Paul C. Gianelli, The Admissibility ofNovel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-
Century Later, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197, 1207 (1980).
23. See Graham, supra note 20, § 703.2.
24. See Gianelli, supra note 22, at 1210-11.
25. Steven J. Grossman & Christopher K. Gagne, Science and Scientific Evidence 11, 25 Conn. L.
Rev. 1053, 1056 (1993).
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many viewed Frye as inconsistent with the policies underlying the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.26
The main criticism of Frye is that it serves as a barrier to valid
scientific techniques during the lag time period necessary for novel
techniques to gain general acceptance. In United States v. Williams,' the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals expressed its frustration with the slow
pace at which a consensus is built when it observed that the Frye analysis
relies on scientific nose counting.28 Judges' hands become tied in that
they must exclude some reliable scientific evidence on the basis of this
nose counting even if the overwhelming evidence regarding the scientific
methodology affirms its validity.
2. Daubert's Rejection ofFrye
In Daubert, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the Third Circuit's
reasoning in Downing that the Frye standard is no longer viable in light
of the Federal Rules of Evidence.29 The Court assigned to the trial judge
the responsibility of ensuring at the outset of the trial that the scientific
evidence is reliable and relevant to the issues of the case.0 FRE 702
establishes the standard for determining the reliability and relevance of
such evidence in that it requires that the expert witness testify to
"scientific knowledge" that will "assist the trier of fact."'" Thus, the trial
judge must make a determination that the "reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and . . . [that the]
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue."' 2
Focusing on the underlying methodology of the expert witness to
ascertain the reliability of the testimony, Justice Blackmun set forth a list
of factors to be considered by judges: (1) whether the technique or theory
"can be (and has been) tested" to determine its "falsifiability"; (2)
"whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and
publication"; (3) the "known or potential rate of error" of a "particular
scientific technique," including the "existence and maintenance of
26. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (1985) ("The general acceptance standard
reflects a conservative approach to the admissibility of scientific evidence that is at odds with the
spirit, if not the precise language, of the Federal Rules of Evidence.").
27. 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978).
28. Id. at 1198.
29. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579,587 (1993).
30. Id. at 592.
31. Id.
32. Id.
1131
Washington Law Review
standards controlling the technique's operation"; and (4) a Frye analysis
of the relevant scientific community.33 Justice Blackmun made it clear
that the list is not to be conclusive, and that each factor is not to be
individually determinative.34
The goal of the Daubert Court was to substitute the "austere" Frye test
with a flexible one in line with the Federal Rules of Evidence.35 The
Court concluded by addressing two of the main concerns voiced by the
advocates for both parties: that abandoning the Frye test would result in a
flood of junk science under more liberal rules, and that a gatekeeping
role for the judge was ill-placed and would stifle scienc e.36 The Court
answered the first question by highlighting the al-eady existing
safeguards such as cross-examination and the burden of proof.37
Therefore, the Court impliedly stressed that a focused inquiry by the trial
judge under the Federal Rules of Evidence should rid courtrooms of junk
science anyway.
38
Answering the second concern, the Court noted that legal disputes, as
opposed to scientific conclusions, should be resolved quickly and finally.
The majority acknowledged that scientific conclusions that are "probably
wrong" may help other scientists to achieve their quest for truth in a
matter.39 In a legal setting, however, the Court dismissed the utility of
such conjectures for "the project of reaching a quick, final, and binding
legal judgment-often of great consequence-about a particular set of
events in the past.' '4 As commentators have observed, it appears a bit
ridiculous to suggest that science depends upon the law for sustenance.4"
Moreover, the judge's gatekeeping role is in "ensuring reliability, not
[scientific] discovery."'42
33. Id. at 593-94.
34. Id. at 594.
35. Id. at 589.
36. Id. at 595-97.
37. Id. at 596.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 597.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Thomas Michael Spitaletto, The Frye Standard Finally Fries: Has Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Furthered the Use of Scientific Evidence in Our Legal System?, 14 Rev. Litig. 315,
333-34 (1994).
42. Id.
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B. Frye and Daubert in Washington
In State v. Woo,43 the Washington Supreme Court mentioned Frye for
the first time. The defendants in Woo were charged with multiple counts
of bribing a police officer.' They then filed motions seeking polygraph
examinations and a ruling that recorded polygraph readings and the
opinion of the operator based thereon would be admissible.45 Without
expressly adopting Frye, the court noted that the general rule, "followed
almost without exception since Frye v. United States ... is that the
results of a polygraph examination are inadmissible at trial."" The court
then concluded that the record was insufficient to depart from the general
rule.47
Washington courts subsequently have found that the Woo court
implicitly adopted the Frye standard for the admissibility of novel
scientific evidence, at least in the criminal context."a Applying the Frye
standard in Washington to evaluate novel techniques in criminal trials,
however, has not been without confusion. Contributing to the confusion
has been determining where the "general acceptance" test falls in the
analytical process after Washington's adoption of ER 702. Although ER
702 does not mention a threshold question of whether the particular
method has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific
community,4" in State v. Maule,0 Division One of the Washington Court
of Appeals 'fit' the Frye standard into ER 702 by placing the reliability
of the method or technique within the framework of the threshold
requirement that the testimony help the trier of fact."'" The Maule court
followed the approach suggested by Judge Weinstein" that permits the
trial judge, in determining whether the opinion is admissible as an expert
opinion, "to assess the reliability of the theory, methodology, procedure
43. 84 Wash. 2d 472, 527 P.2d 271 (1974).
44. Id., 527 P.2d at 272.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 473, 527 P.2d at 272.
47. Id. at 475, 527 P.2d at 273.
48. See, e.g., State v. Canaday, 90 Wash. 2d 808, 813, 585 P.2d 1185, 1188 (1978).
49. Compare Wash. R. Evid. 702 with Fed. R. Evid. 702.
50. 35 Wash. App. 287, 667 P.2d 96 (1983).
51. State v. Huynh, 49 Wash. App. 192, 196, 742 P.2d 160, 164 (1987) (citing Maule, 35 Wash.
App. at 294-95, 667 P.2d at 96).
52. See 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Evidence § 702[01], at 702-19 (1982).
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or principle propounded by the expert and the probative value of his
testimony"" through factors similar to those enunciated in Daubert5 4
Just over a month after Daubert, the Washington Supreme Court
applied the Frye test without mention of the Daubert decision in In re
Young.5 The defendant in In re Young contended that the State's expert
testimony-that Young was likely to re-offend because he had a
particular mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes a person
likely to rape-should have been excluded. The court held that the
standard for admissibility is the "well-established" general acceptance
rule of Frye.6 It should be noted, however, that the defendant only
claimed on appeal that the State's expert testimony failed to meet the
Frye test, and thus there was no dispute as to the appropriate standard to
apply."'
In the more recent case of State v. Riker,58 the Washington Supreme
Court recognized Daubert's holding that the Frye standard is not
applicable under the Federal Rules of Evidence, but nevertheless
continued to adhere to the Frye analysis as a thresholcl inquiry to be
considered in determining the admissibility of evidence under ER 702."9
The court noted, however, that many of the observations rmade by Justice
Blackmun in the majority opinion of Daubert may be helpful to trial
judges in making the threshold Frye determination, and stated in dicta
that their holding of inadmissibility would be the same under a Daubert
analysis."0 Three months later, Division One of the Court of Appeals, no
longer supporting the Frye standard, held in Reese II that Frye was
inapplicable to a civil case,6' forcing the Washington Supreme Court
53. Maule, 35 Wash. App. at 295, 667 P.2d at 100.
54. Specifically, Judge Weinstein stated that
Whether or not the scientific principles involved have been generally acceptod by experts in the
field may still have a bearing on reliability and consequent probative value of the evidence [after
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence] .... The expert's qualifications and stature, the
use which has been made of the new technique, the potential rate of errol; the existence of
specialized literature,... may all enter into the court's assessment.
Weinstein & Berger, supra note 52, at 702-18 tc 19.
55. 122 Wash. 2d 1, 857 P.2d 989 (1993).
56. Id. at 56, 857 P.2d at 1016.
57. Id. at 55, 857 P.2d at 1016.
58. 123 Wash. 2d 351, 869 P.2d 43 (1994).
59. Id. at 360 n.1, 869 P.2d at 48 n.1.
60. Id Because Frye is a factor to be considered under Daubert, it is arguable that the court in
Riker implicitly adopted the Daubert standard, even in a criminal case.
61. Reese 11, 74 Wash. App. 550, 874 P.2d 200 (1994).
1134
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again to address the muddled issue of the admissibility of novel scientific
evidence.
II. REESE V. STROH
A. The Facts
In 1984, William Reese was referred to Dr. Stroh because his asthma
condition had worsened.62 In the spring of 1985, Dr. Stroh diagnosed
Reese as having asthma, chronic obstruction pulmonary disease, and
alpha-l-antitrypsin deficiency (AAT deficiency).63 Dr. Stroh told Reese
that his condition was not serious, but that Reese could expect to lose
lung capacity at a rate of approximately one percent per year faster than
the average person.' However, Reese began to lose lung capacity at a
much greater rate.
In November 1989, Reese's brother also was diagnosed with AAT
deficiency and began Prolastin therapy, which was approved by the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) in 1987.65 Specifically, the FDA
approved Prolastin for treatment of AAT-deficient patients because
Prolastin raises the level of antitrypsin in the blood and successfully
treats other serum protein deficiencies such as hemophilia.66 The FDA
had no statistical proof, however, of Prolastin's efficacy in treating AAT
deficiency.67 Reese called Dr. Stroh about the possibility of starting
Prolastin therapy himself, but Dr. Stroh declined because he believed that
Prolastin was unproven and thought that there might be risks of
transmitting blood-borne infections.68 In March 1990, Reese's condition
significantly worsened, and he began Prolastin therapy under the
supervision of his brother's doctor.
In October 1990, Reese sued Dr. Stroh for medical malpractice,
contending that Stroh's failure to prescribe Prolastin therapy between
1987 (when the FDA approved the treatment) and 1989 (when Reese's
lung capacity fell below critical levels) was preventable negligent action,
resulting in a worsening of his lung function. 69 At trial, Reese called Dr.
62. Reese 111, 128 Wash. 2d 300,302,907 P.2d 282,283 (1995).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 302-03,907 P.2d at 283.
65. Id. at 303, 907 P.2d at 283.
66. Id.
67. Id., 907 P.2d at 283-84.
68. Id., 907 P.2d at 284.
69. Id.
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Fallat as the plaintiffs first expert witness on causation.7" Dr. Fallat was
Chief of the pulmonary division at California Pacific Medical Center in
San Francisco, board qualified in internal and pulmonary medicine, and
had researched AAT deficiency since 1966."' Reese sought to elicit
testimony as to whether Dr. Falla. had an opinion with a "reasonable
medical probability basis" regarding whether Prolastin was an effective
treatment for an AAT-deficient patient like himself.72 Dr. Stroh objected
on foundation grounds and the trial judge sustained the objection. 3 The
trial court then allowed Reese to make an offer of proof as to foundation
outside the presence of the jury.74
Dr. Fallat confirmed that the FDA approved Prolastin for the
treatment of AAT deficiency without statistical proof of is efficacy, but
testified that the FDA decided to release the drug for such use "because it
was very probable that the material was safe and effective."75 Dr. Fallat
also testified that, as of May 1992, over 2000 patients were treated with
Prolastin and that there were no documented cases of hepatitis or AIDS
contamination. He also stated that preliminary results suggested that the
drug was stabilizing the patients. Dr. Fallat acknowledged that only
population studies could prove with statistical significance whether a
particular drug is effective in treating patients with a particular disease,
and that no such study was done on Prolastin. He distinguished,
however, between drawing a conclusion that a drug has in fact been
effective for a certain population and drawing a conclusion that a drug
has a good probability of improving a specific patient's condition. He
testified that for patients with severe AAT deficiency such as Reese there
was a "strong consensus" among the working group members at the
National Institute of Health that Prolastin would be of a particular
benefit.76
In addition to FDA approval of Prolastin and the preliminary positive
results from its use, Dr. Fallat testified regarding his own clinical
experience in treating AAT-deficient patients with Prolastin 7 He stated
that at least half of the thirty-five to forty such patients on his registry
70. Reese 11, 74 Wash. App. 550, 553, 874 P.2d 200,202 (1994).
71. Id.
72. Reese 111, 128 Wash. 2d at 304, 907 P.2d at 284.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Reese 11, 74 Wash. App. at 554, 874 P.2d at 203.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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were being treated with Prolastin, and that Prolastin was safe and
effective for those patients. He also testified that Prolastin therapy was
most effective in patients with severe AAT deficiency and an asthmatic
component, such as Reese, and that he expected that Reese would
respond favorably to the drug.78
On the basis of the information and studies supporting the FDA's
approval of Prolastin, his own clinical experience, and information
regarding the plaintiffs medical condition, Dr. Fallat concluded that,
based upon a reasonable medical probability, Prolastin therapy would be
effective for Reese. 79 He further concluded that, had Dr. Stroh prescribed
Prolastin for Reese as soon as it became available, the treatment would
have reduced the rate of AAT decline by fifty percent. Dr. Fallat also
stated that there "wouldn't be a handful of pulmonologists in the
country" who, given Reese's condition, would not prescribe Prolastin
therapy, and that by failing to prescribe Prolastin, Dr. Stroh did not act as
a reasonably prudent physician. 0
After hearing the offer of proof, the trial court held that Dr. Fallat's
testimony lacked the necessary scientific foundation and was therefore
inadmissible." The court noted that Dr. Fallat did not have a statistically
significant basis for his opinion as to the efficacy of Prolastin therapy in
treating AAT deficiency.82 Although the trial court did not explicitly
state it was applying the Frye test, its explanation for rejecting Dr.
Fallat's testimony indicates that it found that Prolastin therapy was not
generally accepted within the relevant scientific community.83 In light of
this ruling, Reese decided not to call his other expert witnesses, whose
testimony would have been to the same effect as Dr. Fallat's testimony.84
Dr. Stroh then moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court granted
on the basis that Reese could not prove proximate cause.8" Reese's
motion for reconsideration was denied, and he appealed the trial court's
evidentiary ruling.86
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Reese III, 128 Wash. 2d 300,304,907 P.2d 282,284(1995).
81. Reese 11, 74 Wash. App. at 555, 874 P.2d at 203.
82. Reese III, 128 Wash. 2d at 304, 907 P.2d at 284.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 305, 907 P.2d at 284.
86. Id.
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B. Reese II: The Court ofAppeals'Decision
The Washington Court of Appeals, Division One, reversed the trial
court's evidentiary ruling, and held that the trial court erred in not
admitting Dr. Fallat's testimony concerning causation. 7 The court held
that Frye's general acceptance test did not apply in civil cases."8 In
rejecting the Frye test, the court of appeals expressly adopted the
Daubert standard. 9 The court acknowledged, however, that Dr. Fallat's
testimony was admissible under either standard because the methods he
used to reach his conclusion were, in fact, generally accepted in the
scientific community."
In holding that Frye did not apply in civil cases, the coart of appeals
noted that the Washington Supreme Court never expressly adopted the
Frye test in the civil context." Writing for the court, Judge Agid stated
that the Washington Supreme Court "intimated that a Frye analysis is
appropriate only in criminal and quasi-criminal cases."92 To support this
conclusion, Judge Agid cited In re Johnston,93 wherein the Washington
Supreme Court noted that Frye's higher standard need not be met when
determining the admissibility of a urinalysis in a prison disciplinary
proceeding.94 Judge Agid also found it persuasive that Washington
courts, with one exception, have neither discussed nor app ied Frye in a
civil case.95 Judge Agid dismissed the one exceptior., Burkett v.
87. Reese 11, 74 Wash. App. 550,564, 874 P.2d 200,208 (1994).
88. Id. at 556, 874 P.2d at 204.
89. Id. at 557, 874 P.2d at 204.
90. Id. at 556, 874 P.2d at 204.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 109 Wash. 2d 493, 745 P.2d 864 (1987).
94. The Johnston court reasoned that "[Frye's] rationale has been applied in the context of
criminal trials, but not in the context of prison disciplinary proceedings." Id. at 498,745 P.2d at 867.
95. Reese 11, 74 Wash. App. at 556, 874 P.2d at 204.
1138
Vol. ? 1:1127, 1996
ER 702 After Reese v. Stroh
Northern,96 as contrary to the opinion of the court in Reese 1I, 97 and also
noted that it was based entirely on criminal precedent.98
The court further expressed several policy reasons for declining to
apply the Frye analysis in a civil context. First, the court stated that the
"austere" Frye standard originally was adopted to prevent the use of
mechanical technologies that appeared infallible to the average juror,
fearing that an aura of infallibility would cloud the technology's
experimental nature.99 Second, the court highlighted the imbalance in
resources between the prosecution and the defense in a typical criminal
case. Observing that criminal cases often depend on whether defendants
have the financial means to rebut the prosecution's case with their own
expert testimony,' the court stated that the Frye standard serves as a
necessary safeguard in criminal cases to avoid convictions of innocent
parties.' 0'
Finally, the court noted that criminal cases carry a higher burden of
proof than civil cases.'0 2 Thus, the prosecution ought to utilize "highly-
reliable" methodologies and techniques in criminal cases, whereas in a
civil case the testimony need only be reliable and accurate.'0 3 Hence, the
court concluded that in the criminal context the necessary "added
measure of assurance" is supplied by the Frye standard, but in a civil
case the Washington Rules of Evidence are adequate to ensure reliable
and accurate testimony."
The court then analyzed the admissibility of Dr. Fallat's testimony
under ER 702 and 703. Focusing first on ER 702, the court
acknowledged that the judge should determine whether the testimony is
96. 43 Wash. App. 143, 715 P.2d 1159, review denied, 106 Wash. 2d 1008 (1986). Burkett v.
Northern was an action to recover damages resulting from an auto accident. Division IR of the Court
of Appeals applied a Frye analysis in ruling that the expert medical testimony of "scientific
experimental procedures" called thermography was inadmissible. 43 Wash. App. at 147, 715 P.2d at
1161.
97. Reese 11, 74 Wash. App. at 557 n.4, 874 P.2d at 204 n.4.
98. The court in Burkett relied upon State v. Canaday, 90 Wash. 2d 808, 585 P.2d 1185 (1978),
State v. Martin, 101 Wash. 2d 713, 684 P.2d 651 (1951), and State v. Maule, 35 Wash. App. 287,
667 P.2d 96 (1983). Burkett, 43 Wash. App. at 144-45,715 P.2d at 1160.
99. Reese 11, 74 Wash. App. at 557-58, 874 P.2d at 205 (citing People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d
709 (Cal. 1984)).
100. Id. at 558, 874 P.2d at 205.
101. Id. at 559, 874 P.2d at 205.
102. The standard burden of proof in criminal cases is guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as opposed
to guilt by a preponderance of the evidence in civil cases.
103. Reese 11, 74 Wash. App. at 559, 874 P.2d at 205.
104. Id. at 559, 874 P.2d at 205.
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of "'scientific... knowledge' which will 'assist' the trier of fact."'05 The
court read ER 702 as establishing a two-pronged inquiry to assure
reliability and relevance.0 6 The reliability prong is established by
ensuring that the admitted testimony is sufficiently grounded in
"scientific knowledge." 107
In developing the relevance prong of the inquiry, the ccurt also relied
on Daubert to determine whether the scientific testimony will assist the
trier of fact. The court stated that this part of the analysis requires the
trial court to assess "'whether the reasoning or methodology underlying
the testimony is scientifically valid and ... whether thai: reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.""0 8 The court
then adopted the Daubert factors to determine the validity of the
methodology, including Frye's general acceptance test as a factor to be
considered. 09
Finally, the court held that Dr. Fallat's testimony was "grounded in
'scientific knowledge', based on 'what is known.""'0 The court ruled
that an expert witness's lack of a statistical basis for conclusions on
causation does not preclude the admissibility of causation testimony,
"[a]s long as the basic methodology employed to reach.. . a conclusion
is sound.' The lack of a statistical basis affects the weight, not the
admissibility, of the expert testimony." 2 Thus, the court of appeals found
Dr. Fallat's testimony admissible under the Daubert test, reversed the
directed verdict against Reese, and remanded for a new tril. "' Dr. Stroh
then appealed to the Washington Supreme Court.
105. Id. at 560, 874 P.2d at 206.
106. Id.
107. The court followed the Daubert analysis in defining "scientific knowledge" as a belief more
than just a subjective belief or unsupported speculation. Id. (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993)).
108. Id. at 560, 874 P.2d at 206 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 563, 874 P.2d at 207 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590).
111. Id. (citing Intalco Aluminum Corp. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 66 Wash. App. 644,
661, 833 P.2d 390, 399 (1992) (quoting Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535-36
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984))).
112. Id. at 564, 874 P.2d at 208.
113. Id. at 566, 874 P.2d at 209.
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C. Reese I: The Washington Supreme Court's Decision
On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the reversal and
remand, but expressly rejected the court of appeals' reliance on Daubert
as unnecessary.' In the majority opinion written by Justice Madsen, the
court agreed that reliability is a factor in determining the admissibility of
scientific evidence, but found that the court of appeals' utilization of the
Daubert analysis to determine such reliability was improper."5 The court
held that when the admissibility of novel scientific evidence is at issue,
courts should turn initially to the general acceptance test derived from
Frye."6 Only after it has been established by the judge that the testimony
is admissible under Frye can the trial court analyze whether that
testimony is proper expert testimony under ER 702." 7 The majority
reasoned that because Dr. Stroh did not contest that Dr. Fallat's
methodology was generally accepted in the relevant scientific
community, Frye was not implicated." 8 The court further ruled that an
expert opinion regarding application of an accepted theory or
methodology is weighed under the general reliability standards of ER
702 and ER 703, and that Washington case law is sufficient to interpret
those rules without the need for Daubert.' '
The court then observed that the general rule in Washington is that
expert medical testimony on the issue of proximate cause is required in
medical malpractice cases. 2  Hence, under ER 702, such expert
testimony is found to be helpful to the jury's understanding of a matter
outside the competence of an ordinary layperson.12 1 The court thus ended
its analysis of Dr. Fallat's testimony under ER 702's "helpfulness
test."
122
Next, the court turned to a "reliance test" under ER 703)23 The
majority held that ER 703 "permits an opinion based on an expert's first-
hand knowledge or on information generally relied on in the field of
114. Reese III, 128 Wash. 2d 300, 308, 907 P.2d 282,286(1995).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 306, 907 P.2d at 285.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 307,907 P.2d at 286 (citing State v. Ortiz, 119 Wash. 2d 294, 831 P.2d 1060 (1992)).
119. Id. at 307-08, 907 P.2d at 286.
120. Id. at 308, 907 P.2d at 286.
121. Id. (citing Karl B. Tegland, Washington Practice, Evidence § 300 (3d ed. 1989)).
122. Id. at 308-09, 907 P.2d at 286.
123. Id. at 309, 907 P.2d at 286.
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expertise."' 24 The court found that the lack of a statistical basis in Dr.
Fallat's causation opinion was not fatal to his testimony, holding that
medical expert testimony must be based upon a "reasonable degree of
medical certainty."'25
The court finally concluded that Dr. Fallat was prepared to offer an
opinion on causation with a reasonable degree of medical certainty,
based on his extensive experience in treating AAT deficiency and his
participation in and reliance on studies using Prolastin therapy.'26 The
court therefore remanded the case to the trial court for a reassessment of
the proposed testimony in conformity with its opinion.'27 What exactly
should one do to conform with the majority's opinion is the question left
unanswered, and the impetus for thae scalding concurring opinion from
Justices Johnson, Utter, and Smith.
D. Reese III: The Concurring Opinion
In his concurrence with Justice Utter and Justice Smith, Justice
Johnson aptly observed that the majority's approach "is of no
precedential value and offers no help to parties and courts faced with
similar problems."' 28 Justice Johnson concurred in affirming the
evidentiary holding by the court of appeals, but wrote separately "to
provide a constructive framework for applying ER 702 in cases
involving the admissibility of expert testimony based on scientific
evidence" under Daubert.1
29
Justice Johnson noted that the majority found that Dr. Fallat's opinion
on causation should have been admitted because Dr. Fallat was a
qualified expert and his testimony would assist the jury in determining a
fact at issue. 30 He was concerned, however, that the majority did not
provide a clear analysis of how to determine the reliability of the
evidence on which Dr. Fallat's testimony was based, even though it
recognized that such a reliability assessment is required by ER 702.'
124. Id.
125. Reese NII, 128 Wash. 2d at 309, 907 P.2d at 286 (citing McLaughlin v. Cooke, 112 Wash. 2d
829, 836, 774 P.2d 1171, 1175 (1989)).
126. Id. at 310, 907 P.2d at 287.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 310, 907 P.2d at 287 (Johnson, J., concurring).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 315, 907 P.2d at 289 (Johnson, J., concurring).
131. Id.
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Justice Johnson argued that the majority failed to address whether the
proposed testimony by Dr. Fallat constituted scientific knowledge.12 It is
this question, noted Justice Johnson, that determines the reliability of the
expert testimony.'33 He then listed several of the Daubert factors to
consider when making this reliability determination.134
Recognizing that the initial Frye inquiry had been the rule in
Washington in criminal cases, but not in civil cases, Justice Johnson
reasoned that the majority's interpretation of the state's Frye
jurisprudence was unfounded.3 5 He observed that only four cases in
Washington applied a Frye-type analysis to scientific or medical
evidence under ER 702 and ER 703 in a civil context following the
adoption of the Rules of Evidence in 1979.136 Moreover, he found that
these cases do not support the majority's holding that the initial Frye
inquiry applies to a civil case. 137 Justice Johnson then agreed with the
court of appeals' policy reasons for differentiating between civil and
criminal cases. 38 Thus, he concluded that it was inappropriate to extend
the initial Frye inquiry to civil cases, finding that a "constructive
application of ER 702 performs the necessary reliability and relevance
assessment required in all cases involving scientific evidence."' 39
III. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY OPINION IN
REESE III
The majority opinion in Reese III denied the court of appeals'
invitation to adopt Daubert in civil cases. The Washington Supreme
Court stated that existing caselaw was sufficient to have admitted Dr.
Fallat's expert testimony under the general principles of ER 702 and ER
132. Id.
133. Id. at 315, 907 P.2d at 290 (Johnson, J., concurring).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 311, 907 P.2d at 287-88 (Johnson, J., concurring).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 311-12, 907 P.2d at 288 (Johnson, J., concurring) (citing In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d 1,
857 P.2d 989 (1993) (applying Frye separately from ER 702 in civil commitment proceeding); In re
Petersen, 120 Wash. 2d 833, 846 P.2d 1330 (1993) (citing criminal case without explanation in
applying Frye-type test in attorney disciplinary proceeding); Intalco Aluminum Corp. v. Department
of Labor & Indus., 66 Wash. App. 644, 833 P.2d 390 (1992), review denied, 120 Wash. 2d 1031,
847 P.2d 481 (1993); Burkett v. Northern, 43 Wash. App. 143, 715 P.2d 1159, review denied, 106
Wash. 2d 1008 (1986).
138. Id. at 312, 907 P.2d at 288 (Johnson, 3., concurring).
139. Id. at 314, 907 P.2d at 289 (Johnson, J., concurring).
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703.14° In doing so, the court acknowledged that reliability is a factor
when determining the admissibility of scientific evidence, but established
no standard as to how that reliability is determined-under Daubert,
Frye, or otherwise. As a result, it remains unclear in Washington how
reliability, a necessary inquiry under ER 702, fits into the analytical
framework for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence.
A. The Majority Opinion in Reese III Does Not Provide a Test for
Determining When Scientific Evidence Should Be Considered
Novel41
The court side-stepped a novel-scientific-analysis by noting that Dr.
Stroh did not argue that the theory or the methodology involved in
Prolastin therapy lacked acceptance in the scientific community.'42 The
court thus held that "[a]n expert opinion regarding [the] application of an
accepted theory or methodology to a particular medical condition does
not implicate Frye."'43 In doing so. however, the court appears to have
misconstrued Dr. Stroh's argument. Although Dr. Stroh agreed that the
FDA had approved Prolastin for treating AAT-deficient patients, he
argued that the relevant scientific community had not accepted this
treatment as being successful, and thus he had no duty to prescribe
Prolastin therapy in the absence of proof that it was effective.'" Hence,
the assertion that the therapy was in fact effective should have been
construed as a novel theory.
The court of appeals understood Dr. Stroh's argument, but found that
the testimony regarding Prolastin therapy's effectiveness met the
Daubert standard for admissibility, and that any doubts about specific
statistical evidence should go to the weight of such testimony after
140. Id. at 307-08, 907 P.2d at 286.
141. A major concern of the Daubert test is the difficulty in determining the meaning of novel
scientific evidence. See, e.g., Lee Loevinger, Science as Evidence, 35 Jurimetrics J. 153, 178 (1995).
This question is beyond the scope of this Note. However, this author is of the opinion that the
Daubert test should be applied to all expert testimony under ER 702. For a discussion on why
Daubert should apply to all expert testimony, se. G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: the
Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and Its Progeny, 29 Creighton L. Rev. 939, 967-93 (1996).
142. Reese 11I, 128 Wash. 2d at 307, 907 P.2d at 286.
143. Id. (citing State v. Ortiz, 119 Wash. 2d 294, 831 P.2d 1060 (1992) (finding Frye inapplicable
where testimony based not on novel scientific procedures but on practical experience and acquired
knowledge)).
144. Id.
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admitted. 4 Yet the Washington Supreme Court, as the concurring
justices noted, "incorrectly confuse[d] the theory behind Prolastin
augmentation therapy with the therapy itself' in holding that Prolastin
therapy for AAT-deficient patients is not novel. 146 In fact, the court's
conclusion that Frye is not implicated further muddles the question of
when novel scientific evidence exists. As stated by Justice Johnson in his
concurrence, "this ruling only raises additional questions. What is the
methodology properly being considered-augmentation therapy or
Prolastin augmentation therapy? What is the particular medical
condition-abnormal blood serum protein levels or AAT deficiency?"' 47
By separating the Frye inquiry from the ER 702 inquiry, the Washington
Supreme Court continues to adhere to an analysis that promotes
uncertainties. These uncertainties would be eliminated if the Daubert test
is adopted for determining the admissibility of all scientific expert
testimony.'48
B. The Majority Opinion in Reese III Failed To Clarify How
Reliability Should Be Determined Under ER 702
The majority acknowledged that Dr. Fallat's expert opinion testimony
must be reliable under ER 702 and ER 703.149 The court then found Dr.
Fallat's testimony reliable under ER 702 because he was qualified as an
expert and because medical testimony on the issue of proximate cause is
helpful to the jury. 50 Neither the fact that witnesses are qualified as
experts, nor that they are prepared to testify about a subject matter that
would be helpful of the trier of fact addresses the issue of the reliability
of the expert's testimony. Some analysis as to the reliability of what is
being professed must be performed, yet the majority opinion terminated
its ER 702 inquiry without any reliability assessment.''
145. The court of appeals also suggests that it would have found it generally accepted by the
relevant scientific community that Prolastin therapy is effective, implying that if a method is
approved by the FDA it must be accepted that it will be effective, even absent statistical proof of
efficacy. See Reese 11, 74 Wash. App. 550,561, 874 P.2d 200,206 (1994).
146. Reese 111, 128 Wash. 2d at 313, 907 P.2d at 288 (Johnson, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 314, 907 P.2d at 289 (Johnson, J., concurring).
148. Even more so if Daubert is used for all expert testimony. See supra note 141.
149. Id. at 307-08, 907 P.2d at 286.
150. Id. at 308-09, 907 P.2d at 286.
151. The majority's two-prong analysis of ER 702 is followed by a finding that ER 703 in cases
involving medical expert testimony requires only that the opinion be based on a "reasonable degree
of medical certainty." Id. at 309, 907 P.2d at 286 (citing McLaughlin v. Cooke, 112 Wash. 2d 829,
836, 774 P.2d 1171, 1175 (1989) (citing State v. Crenshaw, 98 Wash. 2d 789, 802 n.2, 659 P.2d 488,
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The majority cited State v. Ortiz"' in support of its ER 702 analysis.
Ortiz was a criminal case in which the defendant appealed his conviction
of aggravated first-degree murder.'53 One of the bases for his appeal was
that expert testimony by a tracker"5 was improperly admitted as the
science of tracking had not been generally accepted in the relevant
scientific community.' The Ortiz court articulated the following test for
the admissibility of expert scientific testimony: '(1) the witness
qualifies as an expert, (2) the opinion is based upon an explanatory
theory generally accepted in the scientific community, and (3) the expert
testimony would be helpful to the trier of fact.""5 6 The court held that the
tracker qualified as an expert and that his testimony would be helpful to
the trier of fact. The court also held that the second prong of the test, the
Frye prong, did not apply because the tracker's testimony was "not based
on novel scientific experimental procedures, but rather upon his own
practical experience and acquired knowledge."' 57 The majority in Reese
III inappropriately relied on Oriz to support its ER 702 analysis.
Contrary to the majority's opinion in Reese III, the Ortiz court addressed
the lack of a test for reliability when the second prong is not applied. In
Ortiz, the court observed that the tracker's testimony "was not so
technical that a jury could not judge its reliability for itself."' 58 Because
the testimony required specialized kmowledge, an ER 702 analysis should
have been applied, but the non-technical nature of the testimony justified
shifting the reliability prong to the weight of the evidence, not to its
admissibility. 9
496 n.2 (1983))). In allowing certainty as a standard sufficient to satisfy ER 702, the court appears to
have misunderstood the reliability requirement of the rule. Mere certainty does not always equal
reliability.
152. 119 wash. 2d 294, 831 P.2d 1060(1992).
153. Id. at 297, 831 P.2d at 1062.
154. The tracker, Joel Hardin, testified as to the killer's height and weight, mental state,
familiarity with the terrain and with raspberry bushes, and other facts beyond the! physical conditions
he observed about the tracks left in a field. Id. at 297-98, 831 P.2d at 1062-63.
155. Id. at 310-11, 831 P.2d at 1069.
156. Id. at 310, 831 P.2d at 1069 (quoting State v. Swan, 114 Wash. 2d 613, 655, 790 P. 2d 610
(1990) (quoting State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 596, 682 P.2d 312 (1984), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1046 (1991)).
157. Id. at 311, 831 P.2d at 1069.
158. Id.
159. In addition, the court's holding in Ortiz also appears flawed. Though the testimony of the
tracker may have been non-technical in nature, the use of the techniques of the tacker to prove guilt
was a novel use of such methodology, and should have been subject to an ER 702 novel-scientific
analysis.
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No similar justification existed in Reese v. Stroh. Contrary to the Ortiz
court, the court in Reese III explicitly stated that medical malpractice
cases are "prime example[s]" of cases where expert testimony is admitted
because it is outside the competence of an ordinary layperson."6 Thus,
the court found that it could not shift the reliability analysis to the trier of
fact during trial, nonetheless the court followed Ortiz and skipped the
reliability prong entirely.
The majority opinion in Reese III demonstrates the confusion created
by the Washington Supreme Court's continued insistence on
incorporating a Frye analysis into ER 702. As Justice Johnson states in
his concurrence, "[t]he better approach, and the one taken in Daubert and
by the Court of Appeals, is to focus on the reliability of the evidence...
where the admissibility of scientific evidence is at issue."'' Utilizing the
Daubert analysis in all cases in which scientific evidence is involved
ensures that the expert testimony will be reliable and relevant by
conducting the following inquiry: "(1) whether it is more likely than not
that the expert's methodology and principles are reliable, and (2) whether
those principles and methodology can properly be applied to the facts at
issue." 62 The majority declined to adopt Daubert for performing the
reliability inquiry under ER 702, yet at the same time it held that Frye
also was inapplicable for this purpose. Thus, the decision in Reese III
lacks a reliability determination, even though the court insisted that
reliability was essential to an ER 702 inquiry. Because this result defies
logic and offers no precedential value, the court's opinion is
disappointing, especially at a time when Washington needs a clear
determination of the rule on admissibility.
IV. THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT SHOULD ADOPT
DA UBERT IN BOTH CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES
The Daubert analysis provides a better standard than Frye for
ensuring the reliability and validity of the scientific expert testimony at
issue. Daubert clarifies the judge's role as the gatekeeper, and properly
shifts the focus of the inquiry from a theory's general acceptance to the
underlying validity of the expert's scientific methodology. The U.S.
Supreme Court developed a standard that would be more liberal and
160. Id. at 308, 907 P.2d at 286 (citing Tegland, supra note 121, § 300, at 435).
161. Id. at 316, 907 P.2d at 290 (Johnson, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 315, 907 P.2d at 290 (Johnson, J., concurring) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579,590-95 (1993)).
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flexible in admitting valid techniques without general acceptance, yet
stricter in that Daubert's stringent validity test screens more junk science
after thorough inquiry by the judge. In creating this balance, the Court
formulated a test that could rid cours of outdated techniques, admit valid
novel theories, and meet the challenges of an increasingly technological
society that did not exist when Frye was decided in 1923. The
Washington Supreme Court should correct the inadequacies of its
decisions such as Reese III by adopting the Daubert analysis of ER 702.
A. The Initial Criticisms of Daubert Have Proved Unfounded
A main criticism of the Daubert test was that it was too liberal. Some
commentators feared that Daubert would open the floodgates to "absurd
and irrational pseudoscientific assertions" because junk science could not
effectively be excluded without the bright-line rule o:f Frye.'63 The
opposite has turned out to be true. One study has shown that
approximately two-thirds of the reported cases in the year after Daubert
excluded the expert testimony at issue."M Another review of all federal
cases from Daubert to July 1995 revealed that in nearly seventy percent
of the cases, judges excluded expert testimony on scientific evidence.'65
Thus, judges have taken their gate-keeping role seriously, and expert
testimony is under far greater scrutiny under Daubert than Frye.
Another criticism of Daubert stems from a concern that a complex
inquiry into the scientific evidence will be time consuming and overly
burdensome on the judge. 166 It is true that Daubert hearings may involve
complex determinations; 167  however, the result of a Daubert
determination under ER 104(a) 6 1 will shorten or simplify the remainder
163. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595-97 (addressing the concerns ofamici briefs).
164. Jonathon Hoffrnan, A Briefcase and an Opinion: Post-Daubert Expert 2estimony-A Major
Shift, Product Safety & Liability Rep., Apr. 8, 1994, at 379.
165. Frank C. Woodside, Evidence Problems: Daubert and Beyond, 11 A.L. I.-A.B.A. Continuing
Legal Educ. 101, 107 (1995).
166. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Ci; 1995). On remand
from the United States Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit voiced concern that the Supreme Court had
put judges in the "uncomfortable position" of making complicated scientific determinations; see also
William A. Schroeder, The Future ofFrye in Illinois, 82 111. B.J. 488,494 (1994)
167. It should also be noted, as was evident in the OJ. Simpson fiasco, that Frye hearings
currently run quite long in complex cases. See, e.g., State v. Hollis/DeFroe, No:;. 92-1-04603-9 and
92-1-03699-8 (King County Super. Ct. 1993) (six week Frye hearing).
168. ER 104(a) reads: "Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the
court...." Wash. R. Evid. 104(a). ER 104 is the same as Federal Rule 104(z). Compare Fed R.
Evid. 104(a) with Wash. R. Evid. 104(a). Rule 104 hearings are used frequently in the federal courts
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of the trial, significantly reducing the overall expenditure of judicial time
and money. 69 In any event, if in a particularly complex case the
determination is time consuming, the inquiry is worth the effort to ensure
the validity of the scientific evidence. 7 One significant policy reason for
applying the Frye test was a concern that juries give too much weight to
expert testimony, and thus may decide the case on inappropriate grounds.
By performing the Daubert validity hearing, a court is more capable of
addressing that policy concern than it was under Frye. As one
commentator has stated in support of the Daubert analysis, "valid law
requires valid science to reach a valid decision.''.
B. The Justifications for Utilizing the Frye Analysis in Criminal Cases
No Longer Outiveigh the Benefits of the Modern Daubert Approach.
Washington's biggest barrier to the adoption of Daubert is its
precedent in applying Frye.'72 Division One of the Court of Appeals
recognized this barrier, found it to be especially applicable in criminal
cases, and concluded in Reese I that it could be surmounted in the civil
context. Though at least one commentator suggests that the court in
Reese HI had no business coming to such a conclusion, the court drew
reasonable inferences and its interpretation of the caselaw was
justified.74 The precedent of applying Frye in a criminal context is
to determine whether the expert scientific testimony meets the Daubert standard. Fenner, supra note
141, at 948. At the Daubert hearing, the proponent of the evidence will have to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the evidence satisfies Daubert. Id
169. See Fenner, supra note 141, at 957.
170. See infra note 181.
171. Loevinger, supra note 141, at 187.
172. Precedent alone is not a sufficient reason for its continued adherence in Washington. Federal
Frye precedent pre-Daubert was just as strong. Because Washington adopted the Federal Rules of
Evidence for determining the admissibility of expert testimony, and the current interpretation of
those rules exists in Daubert, the Washington Supreme Court must at the least explain why Frye
should be applied in its place.
173. Colette Mulrenan Smith, Recovered Memories of Alleged Sexual Abuse: An Analysis of
Repressed Memories Under the Washington Rules of Evidence, 18 Seattle U. L. Rev. 51, 69-74
(1994).
174. Smith criticized the opinion in Reese H because "[c]ontrary to Division I's assertion, the
courts of Washington have discussed and applied the Frye standard in more than one civil case," and
"the Washington Supreme Court has adequately supported its application of the Frye standard in
civil cases." Id. at 70. Smith noted that Frye or a Frye-like test was also applied in In Re Peterson,
120 Wash. 2d 833, 869, 846 P.2d 1330 (1993), and Intalco Aluminum Corp. v. Department of Labor
and Industries, 66 Wash. App. 644, 833 P.2d 390 (1992), review denied, 120 Wash. 2d 1031 (1993).
Smith observed that the court acknowledged the Peterson decision, but suggested that the court
chose not to consider it as applying Frye because the Washington Supreme Court "had only
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undoubtedly a much higher hurdle to overcome.175 In the post-Daubert
decision of State v. Riker,"6 the court acknowledged Daubert, but
nevertheless "continue[d] to adhere to the . . . Frye atialysis ...in
determining the admissibility of evidence under ER 702."' 7 Similarly, in
the recent case of State v. Gregory,7' Division One of the Court of
Appeals by-passed the defendant's invitation to decide whether the Frye
test should be adhered to in criminal cases, stating that the issue is
"proscribed by last year's decision in State v. Riker."'79 The Gregory
court noted, however, that the issue had not properly been preserved at
suggested a 'Frye-type' rule and did not cite to Frye.. . ." Smith, supra note 173, at 70. What must
be remembered, however, is that the court of appeals considered Peterson to be a quasi-criminal
case, and the court merely noted that the opinion in Peterson did not cite Frye or discuss its
application "in the civil context." Reese If, 74 Wash. App. 550, 557 n.5, 874 P.2d 200 n.5 (1994). In
addition, the case that the Peterson court cited in support of its Frye-type analysis, State v. Ciskie,
110 Wash. 2d 263, 751 P.2d 1165 (1988), is a criminal case, something the Reese 11 court felt
contributed to the flawed application of the Frye standard in Burkett v. Northern, 43 Wash. App.
143, 715 P.2d 1159, review denied, 106 Wash. 2d 1008 (1986). Id. at 557 n.5, 874 P.2d at 205 n.5.
In Intalco, the defendant appealed a Board of Industrial Appeals' award of wcrkers' compensation
benefits to three workers who claimed to have become disabled because of leng-term exposure to
toxic substances at their employers' plant. 66 Wash. App. at 647, 833 P.2d at 392. The defendant
argued that the Board inappropriately admitted testimony by the workers' physicians on causation
without a showing that their causation theory wzs substantiated by other studies Id. at 659, 833 P.2d
at 398. Judge Agid, also the author of Reese 11, held that the conclusions of expert witnesses need not
meet a requirement of general acceptance in the scientific community. Id. at 662, 833 P.2d at 399-
400. In an opinion similar to that of the Washington Supreme Court's in Reese III, Judge Agid found
that because the techniques and methodologies used by the plaintiffs' physicians were not
challenged, a validity test (Frye or otherwise) Nas not implicated, and any doubts as to the experts'
conclusions were to be decided by the jury. Id. It is important to note that Intalco, along with Burkett
and Peterson, were all pre-Daubert decisions. In support of her conclusion that Frye was adequately
established as the standard in civil cases before Reese, Smith highlights the Burkett court's
understanding of ER 702 as backing an application of Frye as the appropriate stindard. Smith, supra
note 173, at 71. As has been previously discussed, ER 702 incorporates into Washington Federal
Rule of Evidence 702. Prior to Daubert, the Frye analysis had been utilized in federal cases
involving novel scientific evidence, consistent with the determinations of the courts of Washington.
It was Daubert that created a new interpretation of FRE 702, thus impliedly a new interpretation of
ER 702. Reese II was the first case to entertain the continued applicability of the Frye standard in a
civil case after Daubert. Reese HI, 74 Wash. App. at 557, 874 P.2d at 204. The court in Reese 11 did
not argue that the Washington Supreme Court had drawn a distinction between criminal and civil
cases in determining the applicability of novel scientific evidence. The court merely found that in
light of Daubert's indirect interpretation of ER 702 as eliminating the Frye an;dysis, Washington's
Frye precedent in the civil context was not strong enough to withstand a Daubert analysis challenge.
Thus, the court of appeals itself, not the Washington Supreme Court, justifiably drew the
civil/criminal distinction.
175. Precedent alone, however, is no reason to adhere to a flawed standard. See supra note 172.
176. 123 Wash. 2d 351, 869 P.2d 43 (1994).
177. Id. at 360 n.1, 869 P.2d at 47 n.1 (1994).
178. 80 Wash. App. 516,910 P.2d 505 (1996).
179. Id at 522, 910 P.2d at 508.
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the trial court level, arguably implying that if it had been, Division One
would have sent a challenge to the Washington Supreme Court as to its
long-standing adherence to Frye in criminal cases. 8
Although the supreme court has remained firm in its application of
Frye in criminal cases, 8' many lower courts, like the court in Gregory,
have followed supreme court precedent unenthusiastically. State v.
Cissne,"' a 1994 Division Three Court of Appeals decision, provides an
example of how some lower courts have dealt with the issue in the face
of Washington Supreme Court precedent. The defendant in Cissne
appealed his conviction of driving while intoxicated on the basis that it
was prejudicial error to admit the results of a horizontal gaze nystagmus
(I-IGN) test8 . without evidence that the relevant scientific community
had generally accepted HGN testing as reliable.'" The State contended
that because HGN testing does not involve scientific principles, Frye is
inapplicable when not offered to prove a specific blood alcohol level. 8
The court acknowledged that other jurisdictions had refused to apply
Frye, even when these jurisdictions found that HGN evidence was
scientific evidence. 86  The court further recognized that "other
jurisdictions have rejected Frye in favor of a more liberal test of
180. Id.
181. The most recent case to uphold the Frye standard as a threshold inquiry in criminal cases
involving novel scientific evidence is State v. Copeland, 130 Wash. 2d 244, 922 P.2d 1304 (1996).
Copeland involved the admissibility of DNA evidence in a premeditated murder and felony murder
conviction. Id. at 1310. The Copeland court rejected the State's invitation to adopt the Daubert
standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence. Id. at 1315. In doing so, the court reasoned that
the Daubert analysis is flawed because judges should not be subjected to the "difficult task" of
analyzing opinions involving methods "far beyond their knowledge." Id. at 1314-15. A critical
analysis of the Copeland opinion, though enticing, is beyond the scope of this Note. However,
because a particular lawsuit involves a highly technical subject is no justification for allowing a
judge to shift evidentiary determinations to scientists. For a more thorough response to the Copeland
court's only articulated criticism of Daubert, see Loevinger, supra note 141, at 181-189.
Furthermore, the use of judicial notice will minimize the need for judges to engage in time-
consuming investigations, especially if they are allowed to look at the body of federal law decisions
interpreting Daubert. See injra note 200 and accompanying text.
182. 72 Wash. App. 677,865 P.2d 564 (1994).
183. The police officer explained during the trial that HGN testing is based on the medical belief
that with a certain degree of intoxication the eyes are unable to track smoothly and/or track at all.
Under extreme intoxication the eye will be "unable to follow and.., go into a spaz effect and the
pupil will actually just fluctuate back and forth rapidly from side to side while... trying to focus on
the object." Id at 680 n.2, 865 P.2d at 566 n.2.
184. Id. at 679, 865 P.2d at 565.
185. Id. at 680, 865 P.2d at 566.
186. Id. at 685, 865 P.2d at 568 (citing State v. Clark, 762 P.2d 853, 856 (Mont. 1988) ("[Its]
liberal evidentiary rules have eroded the 'general acceptance' standard of Frye. ").
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admissibility based on the relevance standard of the Federal Rules of
Evidence ... ,,I87 The court then went on to hold that the Frye standard
applies to HGN testing if proven on remand that it is a novel technique
"until such time as our Supreme Court abandons Frye and interprets ER
702 in the same manner as Daubert interpreted Fed. R. Evid. 702 ....,
In the court of appeals' opinion in Reese II, Judge Agid stated two
reasons why the policy considerations in favor of applying the Frye
standard do not apply in the civil context: (1) criminal defendants often
lack the economic means to retain scientific witnesses necessary to wage
a "battle of the experts," and (2) because of the potential loss of liberty,
added measures of assurance are required to ensure a reliable and
accurate conviction. 89 Both of these justifications rely on the belief that
the Frye analysis creates a more stringent standard for admissibility,
providing a necessary safeguard against criminally convicting an
innocent person. As previously discussed, post-Daubert cases have
shown that the Daubert standard is, in effect, a more stringent standard
due to its thorough analysis, and can provide greater safeguards to the
criminal defendant than Frye. Furthermore, as one of the factors
considered in a Daubert analysis, Frye can still play a role in excluding
unsubstantiated methodologies.
C. The Daubert Analysis of Novel Scientific Evidence Is Well-Suited to
Meet the Challenges ofModern Technological Advances
Calls for the reform of expert testimony have permealed throughout
the history of jurisprudence. 90 The pre-Daubert reform movement
stemmed from the overwhelming perception that expert witnesses are
nothing more than hired guns. 9 ' Expert witnesses are both disdained and
indispensable. Some reform was necessary to ensure a reliable and
accurate evaluation of expert witness testimony. Joining this reform
movement, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted FRE 702 in Daubert to
provide courts with the necessary framework, coupled with the tools
187. Id., 865 P.2d at 569 (citing State v. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d 879, 886, 846 P.2d 502, 505
(1993)).
188. Id. at 686, 865 P.2d at 569.
189. Reese 11, 74 Wash. App. 550, 558-59, 874 P.2d 200,205 (1994).
190. See, e.g., Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert
Testimony, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1901).
191. See Samuel P. Gross, Expert Evidence, i991 Wis. L. Rev. 1113, 1115 (1991) ("[L]awyers
and experts alike see expert witnesses... as whores.").
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already provided by the adversary system, to screen out unreliable
scientific testimony. 192 Daubert has been successful in this regard.
At least one commentator has suggested that the reform of expert
testimony go even further and interpret FRE 702 as requiring not just
reliability, but also necessity.93 Perrin argues that the current climate in
which expert witnesses testify justifies a presumption of inadmissibility,
similar to the presumption used for hearsay evidence.'94 Thus, Perrin
would require Daubert to be codified in Rule 702 for all expert
testimony in all cases because Daubert's requirement of scientific
validity is "the appropriate standard for measuring reliability."'
95
Perrin further argues that any "marginally reliable expert testimony
[should] satisfy a necessity requirement, limiting expert testimony to that
which is needed by the jury to resolve an issue in the case." '196 Perrin, in
essence, would require that the proponent of the evidence show that the
expert testimony is beyond the comprehension of the trier of fact.' 97 This
necessity prong elaborates on the "fit" portion of the Daubert opinion.
Perrin's approach is problematic because it would exacerbate concerns
that the Rule 702 determination is time consuming and overly
burdensome. In addition to conducting the Daubert validity analysis,
courts would need to determine when expert testimony becomes
marginal, and then if it is deemed to be marginal, they must decide where
to draw the line on the burden of necessity. Many commentators already
believe that the Daubert test is inconsistent due to the greater discretion
given to judges as gate-keepers. 98 Perrin's approach, although arguably
more thorough, would magnify these concerns. It is essential that
192. The Court specifically mentioned cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and
jury instructions on the burden of proof. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 596 (1993).
193. See Timothy Perrin, Expert Witness Testimony: Back to the Future, 29 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1389
(1995).
194. Id. at 1453. Perrin believes that because experts are really paid advocates, evidence rules
should be skeptical, not "trusting" and "liberal." Id.
195. Id. at 1454.
196. Id. at 1462-66.
197. Id. at 1463. As an example of evidence not meeting this burden, Perin discusses expert
testimony about the meaning of certain words. Id. (citing World Boxing Council v. Howard Cosell,
715 F. Supp. 1259, 1264-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that jury was capable of reading Cosell's
book and comparing it to articles he claimed to have relied on without assistance of plaintiff's expert
in media relations and communications research)). As examples of instances meeting this burden,
Perrin lists the standard of care in a professional malpractice case and forensic DNA testing. Id.
198. Perrin himself lists "the likely inconsistent application" of Daubert as one of its difficulties.
Perrin, supra note 193, at 1447.
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Washington adopt an approach that is not only theoretically sound, but is
also practical in its application.
D. A Blueprint for Washington Courts to Follow When Applying a
Daubert Analysis
A perfectly written rule that encompasses all of the concerns about
abuses in the use of expert testimony has proven elusive. The Daubert
analysis provides the most comprehensive standard for determining the
scientific validity behind an expert's testimony, addressing the most
pressing need of excluding junk science so that juries can make
determinations based on reliable evidence. Because courts may have
concerns that the Daubert test is too time-consuming, especially at the
superior court level, Daubert hearings should be conducted in a
structured, straightforward manner. The following is a suggested outline
for courts to utilize in conducting an efficient Daubert hearing:
1. Is the witness qualified to testify as an expert?
2. Is the expert testifying about scientific knowledge?'99
3. Is the general theory and methodology reliable?
a) Is the technique so well established that jadicial notice
can be taken of its scientific validity? 200
b) If no judicial notice can be taken, is the scientific
opinion "based on the 'methods and procedures of
199. This test is also applicable for technical or other specialized knowledge. See supra note 141.
200. This step of the Daubert process is a practical necessity, and will serve over time to
drastically reduce time-consuming battles of expert witnesses in judicial proceedings. When to take
judicial notice, however, is a fine line that should not be used as a cover for implementing the Frye
test in Daubert clothing. The key difference is that judicial notice should be taken once a certain
methodology has been through the rigors of the Daubert test in the Washington Supreme Court,
enough other courts, or has passed the Daubert test by such a large margin in one court that the
reliability of the methodology is beyond a reasonable doubt. In State v. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d 879,
846 P.2d 502 (1993), the Washington Supreme Ccurt stated that other jurisdictions and law reviews
and journals may be examined when deciding whether to admit or exclude novel scientific evidence.
120 Wash. 2d at 888, 846 P.2d at 506. This type of examination would enhance fbrther the
utilization of judicial notice in cases involving novel scientific evidence. Because Daubert is the
standard used in the federal courts and in a majority of the states, application of Daubert in
Washington would allow Washington courts to take advantage of the benefits of the analyses in
these other jurisdictions. Hence, the Daubert standard plus the Cauthron inquiries should eventually
equal significant gains in judicial efficiency.
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science' rather than on 'subjective belief or unsupported
speculation?"'
20 1
i) Can the theory and methodology be tested?
ii) Has the theory and methodology been tested?
a) What was the rate of error?
b) What maintenance of standards and
controlling techniques were used?
c) Was the testing done specifically for the
current litigation?
iii) Has there been peer review of the theory and
methodology?
a) Has the theory and methodology been
published?
b) Is the theory and methodology generally
accepted in the relevant scientific
community?
c) Is the technique commonly used in a
particular field?202
iv) Are there any other relevant factors the court
should consider concerning the reliability of the
theory and methodology?
c) Does the expert's testimony assist the trier of fact?
i) Is there a certain fit between the methodology
and the case at bar?2
3
ii) Does that fit continue throughout each step of
the methodology?
4. Is the probative value of the proferred opinion "substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence?' 2
4
201. See In re Paoli R.RL Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 742 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1253
(1995).
202. Id. at 742 (considering "the 'non-judicial uses to which the scientific techniques are put').
This factor becomes more important as the Daubert test is used for experts with specialized
knowledge outside of the scientific realm. See Fenner, supra note 141, at 966.
203. See In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 743-45 (requiring "more than bare logical relevance").
204. See Wash. R. Evid. 403.
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5. Is the data relied on by the expert "of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject" 2"
The requirement of valid scientific evidence for admissibility helps to
ensure justice in a society increasingly dependent on science and
technology. As Perrin himself observes, Daubert is an important step in
the reform of expert opinion testimony.0 6 Washington has not yet taken
that step, refusing even to start in that direction by finding Frye
inapplicable in the civil context in Reese II1. Washington should join the
modem world in its application of ER 702, and replace the Frye te§t with
the Daubert test in both civil and criminal cases.
V. CONCLUSION
In Reese III, the Washington Supreme Court had the opportunity to
settle the debate among Washington courts about how to analyze novel
scientific evidence under ER 702 in civil cases. Instead, it muddled the
situation even further by finding a reliability determination necessary
under ER 702 but failing to provide a standard for this reliability
determination. The Daubert standard ensures such a reliability analysis
under ER 702. Furthermore, no justification remains for Frye's
continued application in criminal cases. Washington should adopt the
Daubert analysis of ER 702 for all cases involving novel scientific
evidence so that the courts can be more responsive to today's
increasingly technological needs.
205. See Wash. R. Evid. 703. If judges have concerns about their ability to make this ER 703
determination due to their lack of knowledge of the technique, they should secure their own expert
pursuant to ER 706, which allows the court to "appoint witnesses of its own selection." Wash. R.
Evid. 706(a).
206. Perrin, supra note 193, at 1441.
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